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Background 
• Safety Standards contain technical and process-oriented safety 
requirements. 
• The best time to include these requirements is early in the development 
lifecycle of the system. 
• Software Safety requirements, such as the NASA-STD-8719.13B Software 
Safety Standard, can be imposed on legacy safety-critical systems. 
• Retrospective safety cases need to be formulated as part of recertifying the 
legacy systems for further use. 
• This can be a difficult task because there may be few to no artifacts 
available to show compliance to the software safety requirements. 
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The Problem 
• The risks associated with not meeting safety requirements in a legacy 
safety-critical computer system must be addressed to give confidence for 
reuse. 
• A problem arises when attempting to fulfill the requirements of a software 
safety standard in a legacy real-time safety-critical computer system. 
• "How do we retrospectively make a safety case for the software, perhaps 
to meet new safety standards in the industry?" [i] 
A methodology is needed to accomplish this. 
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The Methodology -1 
• In some cases with legacy systems, it can be a difficult task to construct a 
safety case, because there may be few to no artifacts available to show 
compliance with the software safety requirements. 
• Risk factors in general will be different for legacy safety-critical computer 
systems, and the software within them. 
• These software safety risks must be addressed by project management to 
give confidence for reusing an existing system. 
• Knowing the risks, project managers can then decide whether to try to 
recreate missing artifacts or accept the risks of not having certain safety 
documents or analyses to make the safety case. 
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The Methodology - 2 
• A Software Risk Evaluation (SRE) is a practice that was developed by 
the Software Engineering Institute (SET) containing a formal method for 
identifying, analyzing, communicating and mitigating software technical 
risk. [2] 
The SET's Software Development Risk Taxonomy is a part of this 
practice. 
• Scientists from the SEI developed this taxonomy in the mid 1990's and 
used it with new software development projects. 
• They were able to collect data from several projects to show where the 
most risk occurred in the lifecycle of a project. 
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The Methodology -3 
• For our research, there is a need for a taxonomy specifically focused on 
identifying software  safety risk factors. 
• NASA has a requirement to re-evaluate safety-critical legacy systems for 
reuse. 
• The Software Safety Risk Taxonomy is proposed as a partial 
solution for making retrospective safety cases. 
• The Software Safety Risk Taxonomy was introduced at the SEW 31, 
IEEE/NASA Software Engineering Workshop last March. 
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The Methodology -4 
• In this research the Software Safety Risk Taxonomy is being used in 
addition to the SET's taxonomy to generate a comprehensive list of 
questions for defining an inclusive set of risks for legacy safety-critical 
computer systems. 
• Used in conjunction with the SET taxonomy, the Software Safety Risk 
Taxonomy helps paint a complete risk profile for a safety-critical system. 
• The Software Safety Risk Taxonomy addresses the additional safety 
related tasks and analyses that are required over and above traditional 
software engineering process activities. 
• We are piloting the use of both taxonomies on several small projects at 
KSC. 
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7 
Software Safety Risk Taxonomy 
Software Safety Risk Taxonomy 
Product	 Development	 Program 
Class	 Engineering	 Environment	 Constraints 
Element Safety 	 ... Legacy	 Safety Mgmt.	 workRequirements	 Process	 Environment	 Safety Resources I  
Attribute Safety Reqs.	 Safety ... 	 Program	 Safety ... Safety Identifiable	 Analysis	 Planning Interfaces	 Schedule	 Facilities 
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Product Engineering Class 
Safety Requirements 
Identifiable 
Stability 
Completeness 
Clarity 
Validity 
Feasibility 
Safety requirements traceability 
Safety requirements analysis 
Safety Design 
Safety Functionality 
Difficulty 
Safety Interfaces 
Safety Performance 
Safety Testability 
Hardware Constraints 
Non-Developmental Software 
Safety design traceability 
Safety design analysis 
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Safety Code and Unit Test 
Feasibility 
Safety Testing 
Coding/Implementation 
Safety code traceability 
Safety code analysis 
Safety Integration and Test 
Safety Environment 
Product Integration 
Safety test traceability 
Safety test analysis 
Engineering Specialties 
Safety Maintainability 
Reliability 
Security 
Human Factors 
Specifications 
Legacy
Reverse engineering 
Replacement
9 
Product Engineering Defined 
Product engineering is defined as the technical processes to define, design 
and construct or assemble a product. [3] 
• Product engineeringfor safety is defined as the technical processes used 
to build a safety-critical product. 
• It refers to the system engineering and software engineering activities 
involved in creating a safety-critical system that satisfies specified safety 
requirements and customer expectations. [4] 
• Activities include system hazard analysis, system and software safety 
requirements analysis and specification, system and software safety 
design and implementation, integration of hardware and software 
components, and software and system test for safety-critical systems. 
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Product Engineering Class, Element and Attributes 
• In this paper, we formally define each Element and Attribute 
in the Product Engineering Class of the safety taxonomy. 
Additionally, we describe areas where risks may be found. 
• These definitions are the foundation for the development of 
the questions for the Software Safety Taxonomy Based 
Questionnaire, TBQ. 
• The Product Engineering Class was chosen first because it is 
the largest of the three classes in the safety taxonomy. 
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Product Engineering Class, Safety Design Element, 
Attribute Example - Safety Performance 
Performance is defined as the degree to which a system or component 
accomplishes its designated functions within given constraints, such as 
speed, accuracy, or memory usage. [ii] Safet y performance is defined as 
the ability of a safety-critical system to handle periodic capacity, load and 
timing requirements; this is a fundamental safety property. [io] The 
safety performance attribute refers to time critical performance; real time 
response requirements, performance analyses, reliability analyses, user 
response requirements, 'must work' and 'must not work' requirements, 
failure detection, isolation and recovery requirements. 
110] NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, NASA-GB-8719.13 NASA Software Safety Guidebook, 2004. 
[11) Standards Coordinating Committee of the Computer Society of the IEEE, IEEE Sid. 610,12-1990 IEEE Standard Glossary of Software Engineering 
Terminoiogy,The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, New York, 1990 
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Product Engineering Class, Safety Requirements Element, 
Example - Safety Requirements Analysis TBQ questions 
A. Product Engineering 
1. Safety Requirements 
h. Safety requirements analysis 
[Are safety requirements analyzed using a specified methodology?] 
(1( Was a Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) performed for this system? 
(Yes) Is the PHA available for review? 
(Yes) Is software included as a part of the PHA? 
1 2 ( Was a System Safety Analysis (SSA) performed for this system? 
(Yes) Is the SSA available for review? 
(Yes) Is software included as a pail of the SSA? 
(3 Are the system and software safety requirements analyzed for proper flow 
down from the system level requirements? 
(No) Who is responsible for doing the safety analyses? 
14 (What types of safely analyses are performed? 
a. Requirements Criticality Analysis 
b. Software Fault Tree Analysis 
c. Software Safety Requirements Flow-down Analysis 
d. Timing. Throughput and Sizing Analysis 
e. Peer Reviews and Inspections of safely requirements 
f,Traceability Analysis 
g. Control Flow Analysis 
h. Information Flow Analysis 
(5 (Are safety analyses documented? 
(Yes) Are the documented analyses results under configuration control?
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Product Engineering Class, Requirements Element, 
Prototype of the Software Development Risk Taxonomy 
° Taxonomy Baied QuestionnaIre
Taxonomy Based Questionnaire	 I	 000. 
Project	 TjstPnojIlI
	
- -.
	
TanonomicCisso: 'Product Enginemirtg 
Requirements	 Rec1s Pg. 2 t Design	 Design Pg 2 I Code an 	 UnitTest I Integration and Test ulnt, arid Test 2i Engr Specreltres 	 Eng	 Specu 
a. Stability	 [5] Are the external interfaces completely defined?___ . 
/.4ror.qw,emen!,changing euwrnenthepradudisbamg	 Yes 0 No daxoloped?') 
(1] Ne the requirements stsbie? [Ara ,eqw,ome,r,soctooi or/n oneedo/inloipieIoi/on?J 
0 Yes 0".	 [7] Ne you ebb to understood the requirements as written? ('1o)[1s] System Effect	
-_	 DYes El No 
(No) (7.a] Are the ambiguities being resolved sstisfatloriy? (2) Are the eulemst interlaces changing?	 Yes 0 No 
 (Yes) [7.bJ There are no ambiguities or problems of interpretation? 
/Are ,equu'ementsnrbflnrg o,/nconrp/ate4'cpeited?)	 DYes 0 No 
(31 Are there enyTeos in the specifications? 	 iLali,ltht 
C1 Y	 oNe	 I" the requirwnentn leod/oth. produdAe customer has ,a mood?] (8] Are there soy noqs. That may not epec/ywhat the customer neatly (4] Are there requirements you know should be in	 wsjtts? 
the specification but srenr?	 o Yes Cl No	 -	 -	
-- - 
o Yes 0 No
 
(Yes) [4.a] Will you be ante to get these
	 (Yes) (Se] How are you reeoknng this? 
requirements into the system?	 [9] Do you and the customer understood the same thing bythe neqs.? 
E] Yes 0 No	 El Yes 0 No (5] Does the customer have unwritten nequirement/erqnectatrons?
	
(Yes) [tie] Is there s process to determine this? 
DYes 0 N .
	
DYes 0 N 
(r'en) [Se] Is there away to capture these requirements?	 [10] How do you validate requirements? 
DYes [3 No
ASWEC_03-25-08	 14 
Legacy Systems Risk Database: Preliminary Data Model 
ThQ AJ4'VER5 
P teas 
&•• 
Ffl**IDflY1 TBO.Ctrn Pk 1 IzaaUS 
U2Jfl4 F4jU Lr 
TOO RU*
4
Emil 
*3*4 *40
- FKr3jI CIa._I* Cue *3.44 
Mamas 2 DCC SutP.4 Id 
Ift.dlfl% 7 ,t *3u4 C4a3d*, 
am 
IKI FK2II.*3 AtPbIItId 
SC SCala IC IKIJSAI Standard C 
Paid 
Cc	 .Iarrlwa,a
UI Afl*IbUI,jd 
10 .1*13 Cr01511 4 
,nrurypmgy.r 'Cirball labIle 
C$I1U ..S.451I., 40*, 10.1 
01mI.idl.SI4I_1C 
$fl!fl<Ufl,.AI40_flr 
SatOy.U*4,_AJOC 
Sator1cR.lafibnUtd 
Old CInISOt tact 
bFWfl_InIlaI_S*.*Tal
ASWEC_03-25-08
	
15 
Questions? 
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